Chiles v. Salazar · ¶111

Given all this, one might think today's majority would make more of an effort to explain why the MCTL does not likewise qualify as a regulation of “professional conduct that incidentally burden[s] speech.” Ibid.; see ante, at 646–650. Such an inquiry would entail evaluating whether the MCTL's restriction on Chiles's therapy only “incidentally” restricts Chiles's speech by virtue of the fact that the medical care she provides is delivered orally. It would also require acknowledging that the MCTL's restriction on Chiles is plainly “tied to [the provision of] a [medical] procedure,” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 770—one that, but for Colorado's law, a licensed counselor like Chiles might offer to minors.

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