Chiles v. Salazar · ¶113

Yet, the majority strangely suggests otherwise with the opinion it hands down today. Ante, at 646–650. The majority does this primarily by eschewing serious engagement with the interaction between NIFLA and Casey. Its workaround seems to be: The First Amendment applies full bore here because Chiles's speech is being impacted; after all, she is a talk therapy provider. Ante, at 644–650. But when NIFLA's teachings are properly understood, this comeback is no answer. Yes, Chiles happens to be talking when she's providing therapy to patients, but the MCTL regulates the provision of medical treatments by licensed medical professionals, which States are fully empowered to do. That Chiles's kind of medical care involves talk therapy is, in NIFLA's words, merely “incidenta[l].” 585 U. S., at 769.

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