Chiles v. Salazar · ¶114

I am the first to admit that, as applied to talk therapists like Chiles, the MCTL restricts speech—I do not argue that this law really just limits Chiles's professional conduct. See ante, at 644–645, 647–648 (characterizing Colorado's argument). Similarly, I do not maintain that, because this law primarily regulates talk-therapists' professional conduct, it should not be conceived of as a speech restriction. See ante, at 649. I agree with the majority that, in cases like Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971), we frmly rejected a State's attempt to suppress free speech by calling the restricted expression “conduct.” Ante, at 648–649. But, here, the observation that the MCTL indeed restricts Chiles's “speech” (not reformulated as conduct) just raises the question that this case presents: Whether the MCTL is restricting Chiles's speech “incidentally” to its regulation of medical…

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