Chiles v. Salazar · ¶115

The majority's failure to acknowledge that this is the actual issue here—not just whether Chiles's “speech” or “conduct” is being restricted, but what the State is doing— ignores what has always been true under our precedents. The real lesson of NIFLA's discussion of Casey is this: When a healthcare professional's speech is not being targeted “as speech” (because it conveys an idea) but is instead “incidentally” restricted due to a State's otherwise legitimate regulation of the medical treatments being offered to patients, heightened scrutiny is not warranted. 585 U. S., at 769–770; Casey, 505 U. S., at 884 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).

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