Chiles v. Salazar · ¶117

NIFLA's focus on a State's regulation of medical treatments also undermines the position the United States has taken on today's First Amendment question. The United States, joining this case as amicus curiae, insists, in essence, that when the NIFLA Court acknowledged that States can regulate professional conduct while “incidentally” restricting speech, it was blessing only two circumstances: (1) where the speech that is being restricted is inextricably tied to an act of the speaker (so, speech-only therapists are never included), or (2) where speech is being regulated in a manner entirely unrelated to its content. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17–21; see ante, at 643, 647–649. But, under NIFLA's reasoning, that cannot be so—at least not logically.

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