Chiles v. Salazar · ¶118

With respect to the first category, the United States mistakenly swaps “integral” (i. e., whether the restricted speech is bound up with the regulated conduct) for “incidental”— but these are two completely different concepts.Given NIFLA's focus on the “incidental” nature of the challenged speech restriction, the State's objective is the actual fulcrum: We ask whether, on the one hand, the State's law is restricting the provider's speech “incidentally” (meaning in the course of the State's pursuit of its primary objective of regulating the provision of medical care), or whether, on the other, the State's law is restricting her speech “as speech” (primarily to suppress its message or expressive content). 585 U. S., at 769–770. The appropriate scrutiny level logically follows: Incidentally restricting speech needs less scrutiny because we view the State as generally regulating the…

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