Chiles v. Salazar · ¶124

So, at the end of the day, I think what we have here is what Casey involved and NIFLA did not: a State restricting a medical provider's speech only as part of its regulation of the provision of medical treatments to individual patients. See NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 769–770; Casey, 505 U. S., at 884 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). And it is precisely because the MCTL is restricting Chiles's speech “only as part of [her] practice of medicine” that the First Amendment is not particularly bothered despite the impact on her speech. Casey, 505 U. S., at 884 (same). Accordingly, talk therapists like Chiles—just like any other healthcare provider seeking to treat patients—can presumptively be “subject[ed] to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.” Ibid.

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