Chiles v. Salazar · ¶147

Ultimately, then, no traditional First Amendment principle justifes preventing a State from regulating medical care simply and solely because its law happens to restrict treatment-related speech. And in this case, there is zero evidence that Colorado has engaged in the corrosive and illicit suppression of ideas that the First Amendment valiantly repels. The record here does not show that Chiles is being “target[ed]” or “muzzle[d]” or “silenced” or “censor[ed],” as the majority suggests. Ante, at 646, 647, 653, 655. Instead, as a healthcare provider licensed by the State of Colorado, she is simply being held to the same standard of care that all other licensed medical professionals in that State must follow. The MCTL's conversion-therapy ban only incidentally restricts professional medical speech as a result of Colorado's regulation of a harmful medical treatment; nothing compels the…

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