Chiles v. Salazar · ¶175

Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority's analysis or its conclusions in this case. The majority finds, at bottom, that Colorado likely cannot legislate to protect the children of its State if, by doing so, it happens to keep state-licensed healthcare providers from saying what they want to say to minors. And the majority's holding means, in effect, that just because Chiles is a talk therapist—and not, say, a surgeon—a State can be prevented from incidentally imposing reasonable restrictions on the treatments she provides. Our precedents do not compel this conclusion. In fact, NIFLA draws a different line, and the correct course of action here is to hold it: Speech uttered for purposes of providing medical treatment may be restricted incidentally when the State reasonably regulates the speaker's provision of medical treatments to patients. Id., at 769–770.

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