Chiles v. Salazar · ¶34

Of course, with almost any rule comes exceptions. And this Court has recognized a “few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the bar” where content-based restrictions on speech will not automatically trigger strict scrutiny—categories that include fraud, defamation, and “fghting words.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). But, as we have taken pains to emphasize, these exceptional categories are few and narrowly drawn, and all share a long and wellrecognized historical pedigree. Ibid.; see NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767. Indeed, even within these categories we have sometimes still applied strict scrutiny when governments have sought to regulate speech based on viewpoint. See, e. g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 392, 395–396 (1992) (addressing an ordinance that barred…

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.