Chiles v. Salazar · ¶36

We repeated the point in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1 (2010). That case involved a federal law banning the provision of “ `material support' ” to certain foreign terrorist organizations. Id., at 8–9. Much as California had in Cohen, the federal government in Holder argued that the law did not trigger strict scrutiny because it addressed “conduct, not speech.” 561 U. S., at 26. We disagreed. True, we acknowledged, the law often might regulate conduct. But, we observed, in the case before us the government threatened to prosecute lawyers, doctors, and others for providing spoken training and expert advice (such as “ `how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes' ”) to certain groups. Id., at 16, 21–22. And that application of the law, we held, sought to “regulat[e] speech on the basis of its content” and thus demanded strict- scrutiny…

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