Chiles v. Salazar · ¶38
In reaching that conclusion, to be sure, we acknowledged two kinds of content-based restrictions that can apply to professional speech without triggering strict scrutiny. First, courts generally deploy less searching review when faced with laws that require speakers to disclose only factual, noncontroversial information in “ `commercial speech.' ” Id., at 768; Zauderer v. Offce of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 650–653 (1985). Second, laws regulating conduct in ways that incidentally sweep in speech may also generally avoid strict scrutiny. NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 769. As with laws addressing fraud, defamation, and “fghting words,” laws regulating speech along these two lines enjoy a long historical tradition. Id., at 767. But, we stressed, neither “turn[s] on the fact” that a licensed professional happens to be speaking. Id., at 768. Nor, we emphasized, do…Read in context ›
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