Chiles v. Salazar · ¶46
Of course, Ms. Chiles remains free to say other things. As Colorado and the dissent emphasize, she may “shar[e] information” about sexual orientation or gender identity. Brief for Respondents 20. She can “criticiz[e] Colorado's law.” Ibid. She can “writ[e] papers” espousing her views. Post, at 677 (opinion of Jackson, J.). She may even encourage a client to seek advice from someone else who doesn't hold a state license. Brief for Respondents 20. But true as all that may be, it is also true that she cannot voice certain “perspective[s]” the State disfavors when speaking with consenting clients. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829. And, under our precedents, viewpoint restrictions like that are not subject to mere rational-basis review or intermediate scrutiny. Rather, they represent “an egregious form of content discrimination” where First Amendment concerns are at their most “blatant.”…Read in context ›
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