Chiles v. Salazar · ¶48

Nor does Colorado's law implicate any recognized exception to our usual First Amendment rules. As we have seen, some laws regulating speech based on its content—like ones addressing fraud, defamation, and “fghting words”—do not generally trigger heightened scrutiny because of their long historical pedigree. See Part II–A, supra. As we have seen, too, NIFLA recognized that two kinds of such laws sometimes apply to professionals. See 585 U. S., at 768. But Colorado's law fts in neither category. The State does not require professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information in their commercial speech.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, Colorado seeks to suppress views Ms. Chiles wishes to express. Nor, with respect to Ms. Chiles, does Colorado's law regulate conduct in a way that only “incidentally burden[s] speech.” Id., at 769. All Ms. Chiles does is…

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