Chiles v. Salazar · ¶49

Resisting this conclusion, Colorado and the dissent try to shoehorn the State's statute into the latter category. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 37. By defning prohibited “conversion therapy” broadly, Colorado observes, its law proscribes a “wide range” of “treatments.” Id., at 18. Any activity that seeks to change a client's gender identity or sexual orientation—whether it involves “electric shocks” or consists of “words only”—is banned. Ibid. And considering the full scope of the law's many applications, the State submits, it seeks to regulate mostly conduct and reaches speech only incidentally. Ibid. The dissent pursues a similar theme, insisting that Colorado has only incidentally prohibited Ms. Chiles's speech because the law's “primary objective” is to regulate medical treatments. Post, at 666–683 (opinion of Jackson, J.).

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