Chiles v. Salazar · ¶52
At bottom, Colorado and the dissent fundamentally misconceive this Court's speech-incident-to-conduct precedents. In these cases, the question is not whether a law mostly addresses conduct and only sometimes sweeps in speech. Instead, the focus lies on two entirely different questions: whether the law in question restricts speech only because it is integrally related to unlawful conduct—or whether the law restricts expressive conduct only for reasons unrelated to its content. Illustrative of the first category, this Court has held that strict scrutiny does not apply to regulations aimed at speech promoting the sale of contraband because such speech is often bound up with traditional criminal conduct. United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 297–298 (2008); see also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502 (1949); Brief for Eugene Volokh as Amicus Curiae 3–11.…Read in context ›
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