Chiles v. Salazar · ¶58

Consider a couple examples. In Alvarez, the federal government pointed to specific, historical laws proscribing fraud and defamation and asked us to extrapolate from them a much broader rule allowing it to enforce content-based restrictions on any “false statements.” In NIFLA, California suggested that informed-consent laws and our speechincident-to-conduct doctrine might be cobbled together to sustain the recognition of a field of “professional speech” subject only to rational-basis review. We rejected both efforts, stressing instead that discrete traditions of content-based regulations cannot be aggregated together to sustain some new and broader category of lesser-protected speech. Al varez, 567 U. S., at 718–722 (plurality opinion); id., at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 767–768; see also Button, 371 U. S., at 439–440 (distinguishing State's law from…

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