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Chiles v. Salazar · ¶62

Turn now to Colorado's effort, again echoed by the dissent, to compare its statute to informed-consent laws. See Brief for Respondents 34–36; post, at 667–669 (opinion of Jackson, J.). Those laws generally require a doctor to inform a patient about “the nature of [a proposed] procedure” and its attendant “risks.” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 769–770 (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, informedconsent laws do not usually trigger strict scrutiny because they regulate speech only incident to separate physical conduct that would, “without [the] patient's consent,” amount to “an assault.” Id., at 770 (internal quotation marks omitted). Usually, too, informed-consent laws require practitioners to disclose only factual and uncontroversial information. See id., at 769– 770. But all that is a far cry from how Colorado's law operates here. As applied to Ms. Chiles, the State seeks neither to…
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