Chiles v. Salazar · ¶71
As the Court states, governments must “nearly always” abstain from adopting viewpoint-based restrictions. Ante, at 641. Those laws represent a particularly “egregious form” of content-based regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns to the highest possible degree. Ibid.; see Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U. S. 388, 393 (2019). A law drawing a line based on the “ideology” of the speaker—disadvantaging one view and advantaging another—skews the marketplace of ideas our society depends on to discover truth. Ro senberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995). And such a law suggests an impermissible motive—that the government is regulating speech because of its own “hostility” toward the targeted messages. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992). If the First Amendment prohibits anything, it is the “official suppression of ideas.” Id., at 390; see Reed v.…Read in context ›
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