Chiles v. Salazar · ¶74

It would, however, be less so if the law under review was content based but viewpoint neutral. Such content-based laws, as the Court explains, trigger strict scrutiny “[a]s a general rule.” Ante, at 640. But our precedents respecting those laws recognize complexity and nuance. We apply our most demanding standard when there is any “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot”—when, that is, a (merely) content-based law may reasonably be thought to pose the dangers that viewpoint-based laws always do. Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, 189 (2007); see supra, at 656. But when that is not the case— when a law, though based on content, raises no real concern that the government is censoring disfavored ideas—then we have not infrequently “relax[ed] our guard.” Reed, 576 U. S., at 183 (opinion of Kagan, J.); see Davenport, 551 U. S., at 188 (noting the…

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