Bowe v. United States · ¶129

Ignoring (E) also makes a nonsense of subparagraph (D)'s instruction requiring a panel to grant or deny certification within 30 days. That mandate is perfectly sensible if, as subparagraph (E) provides, the decision of a three-judge panel is final. But it is wholly insensible if, as Mr. Bowe supposes, any prisoner can seek panel rehearing, then en banc rehearing, and certiorari too. The entire point of AEDPA and its certification process was to “reduce delays,” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 276 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “advance the finality of criminal convictions,” Mayle, 545 U. S., at 662. Yet on Mr. Bowe's reading, the certification process alone would typically take not 30 days but many multiples of that.

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