Bowe v. United States · ¶134

There's no avoiding the odd contours of the majority's clear-statement rule. Apparently, Congress may restrict and channel collateral review in the lower courts, as it has done in subparagraphs (A) through (D). Congress may also bar petitions for panel or en banc rehearing, as it has done in subparagraph (E), cutting off the usual method by which a court of appeals “reconcile[s] its internal difficulties.” Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U. S. 901, 902 (1957) (per curiam). Seemingly, Congress can do all that without having to satisfy any clear-statement rule. The only work the majority's rule performs concerns certiorari petitions— and the only effect that rule has is to pencil out subparagraph (E)'s six words “or for a writ of certiorari” in cases involving federal prisoners. All while leaving those same six words in force when it comes to state prisoners.

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