Bowe v. United States · ¶135

That gerrymandered rule may suit Mr. Bowe's present needs and appeal to our vanity. But it is pointless. Even if a clear statement were required here, Congress gave us one. For all the reasons explored above, AEDPA's certiorari bar imposes, in Hohn's words, a “clear limit” on our jurisdiction. See Part I–A, supra. Nor, again, is there any need to pretend otherwise just to address the circuit split Mr. Bowe identifes, for we can just as easily reach it through certification under § 1254(2) as we can through certiorari under § 1254(1). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit refused to invoke § 1254(2) only because it believed we would deny certification—a belief we could easily dispel in this case simply by saying it isn't so. See App. 78–79.

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