Bowe v. United States · ¶140

The majority's invocation of Boechler is not just inapt, it is unfortunate. Two years ago, in an obscure administrative law case, this Court expressly refused to treat Boechler as a permission slip for creating any manner of new interpretive presumptions that may happen to suit our tastes but that do not “approximat[e] rea[l]” statutory meaning. Compare Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 455, n. 1 (2024) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in light of cases like Boechler, we may as well accept other interpretive fctions like Chevron), with 603 U. S., at 399 (majority opinion) (holding otherwise). Yet that is exactly how the majority treats Boechler today.

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