Bowe v. United States · ¶147

What a leap that is. This case is nothing like those in which we have historically declined to infer limitations on our certiorari jurisdiction based on statutory silence. All agree that § 2255(h) expressly incorporates portions of § 2244(b)(3). All agree that § 2244(b)(3)(E) expressly bars “petition[s] for . . . writ[s] of certiorari.” The only point of disagreement concerns how those explicit provisions ft together. I believe they ft together in a way that deprives us of jurisdiction. But even if I am wrong about that, this is hardly a case of “silen[t] or ambiguous” text, Hertz, 559 U. S., at 83–84, nor one involving provisions that “mak[e] no mention of our authority,” Felker, 518 U. S., at 661. Truly, the majority's clear-statement rule comes from nowhere at all.

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.