Bowe v. United States · ¶38

As relevant here, the Court stressed a fatal faw with the Government's argument. As it explained, “reading the statute as the Government suggest[ed]” to bar jurisdiction in that case “would close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress' intent.” Id., at 380–381; cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 83–84 (2010) (declining to read “silence or ambiguous language as modifying or limiting [the Court's] pre-existing [certiorari] jurisdiction”). That conclusion was also “difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that we `read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly.' ” Castro, 540 U. S., at 381 (quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002)).

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