Fernandez v. United States · ¶103

The takeaway from all this is not, as the majority suggests, that compassionate release has always been understood to be limited to certain kinds of factors (i. e., personal circumstances). See ante, at 424–425. Rather, the statutory and regulatory history establishes that § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides for fexibility and, with one exception, imposes no substantive categorical restrictions on what may constitute a basis for compassionate release. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also § 994(t) (noting that “[r]ehabilitation” is not on its own a statutorily recognized reason for compassionate release). That view tracks with the language of § 3582(c)(1)(A)—which vests district courts with broad discretion to determine whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify a sentence reduction—as well as the unmistakable safety- valve aims of the statute.

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