Fernandez v. United States · ¶109

Instead of acknowledging the poor ft of Preiser and Gon zalez, the majority doubles down, insisting that these cases stand for “an anticircumvention principle.” Ante, at 421, n. 3. That might well be a common thread. But the majority does not explain why the anticircumvention principle applies to § 3582(c)(1)(A)—a statute that, unlike § 1983 or Rule 60(b), specifically authorizes the release of prisoners under given circumstances. For the anticircumvention principle to be apposite, one (specific) statutory directive must be potentially undercut by another (broader) provision. But that does not happen here: Both § 2255 and § 3582(c)(1)(A) establish specific circumstances under which the release of a prisoner is authorized. So the circumvention concern is not implicated on these facts.

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