Fernandez v. United States · ¶52

In any event, this case gives us no occasion to decide the antecedent question whether a prisoner may assert a freestanding actual innocence claim under § 2255. We have never ruled that possibility out and do not do so now. See Herrera, 506 U. S., at 417. Instead, we hold simply that a compassionate release motion is not a vehicle for raising such a claim. A prisoner asserting actual innocence “challenge[s] the validity of his conviction,” id., at 406, whether factually or legally, and that lies “close to the core of habeas corpus,” Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489. If it is “not in substance a `habeas corpus application,' ” it is “at least similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would” forge a path for bypassing the postconviction statutes. Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 531. And for the reasons we have already stated, § 3582 does not provide that kind of shortcut.

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