Fernandez v. United States · ¶68

What is evident is that, in devising this new rule, the majority devotes most of its analysis to describing the contours of habeas relief under § 2255 and gives short shrift to the text and history of § 3582(c)(1)(A). Had the majority focused instead on the statute actually before it, it would have seen that the compassionate-release provision operates as an independent stop-gap measure, designed to preserve a district court's discretion to reduce a criminal sentence when “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warrant that result. And when § 3582(c)(1)(A) is thus properly understood, it is clear that the existence of habeas review has no bearing whatsoever on whether a defendant can seek or obtain compassionate release.

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