Fernandez v. United States · ¶71
Not only is there no explicit basis for the majority's habeas-based rule, there is also no implicit one. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a straightforward grant of discretion: It vests district courts with authority to reduce a prisoner's sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” are commonly understood to relate to a narrow and specific set of circumstances defined by degree, not type. See Rutherford v. United States, 608 U. S. 454, 480 (2026) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). As the majority acknowledges, “ `[e]xtraordinary' means `most unusual,' `far from common,' and `having little or no precedent,' ” while “ `compelling' means `tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence.' ” Ante, at 423 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 463, 807 (1976)). Neither definition implies the exclusion of any kind of…Read in context ›
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