Fernandez v. United States · ¶81

Significantly for present purposes, Congress was well aware of § 2255 in 1984. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 98–225, at 234 (cross-referencing § 2255 in explaining a different provision of the Sentencing Reform Act). But it never suggested that § 3582(c)(1)(A) and § 2255 were mutually exclusive, much less that habeas was the sole means of obtaining postsentencing relief from an unjust conviction. Nor did Congress indicate that the availability of compassionate release hinged on the unavailability of habeas review. Instead, it was clear from the start that compassionate release was a distinct vehicle for addressing potential inequities with respect to a defendant's sentence: one specifically designed to allow for the fexible consideration of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances notwithstanding the restrictions that otherwise made the sentencing system less discretionary. Id., at 121…

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