Villarreal v. Texas · ¶36

Villarreal's hardline position—that the Sixth Amendment permits no restriction of a defendant's consultation right during an overnight recess—thus fails to account for the content-related premises underlying Geders and Perry. It is inconsistent too with another such premise: Perry's explanation that something shifts “when a defendant becomes a witness.” 488 U. S., at 281; see also id., at 282 (“[W]hen he assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses—rules that serve the truthseeking function of the trial—are generally applicable to him as well”). Villarreal says the shift merely allows a judge to prohibit “impermissible coaching,” which Villarreal defines as soliciting perjury. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. But, of course, soliciting perjury is always improper; a judge's instruction to avoid it would raise no more eyebrows at the outset of trial than leading…

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