Villarreal v. Texas · ¶39

This rule follows naturally from our precedents and the principles underlying them; in particular, the recognition that conferral orders are “a corollary” of the traditional practice of witness sequestration, refashioned to accommodate the special protections of a defendant. Perry, 488 U. S., at 281–282. Witness sequestration (the exclusion of a witness from the courtroom prior to his testimony) prevents the witness from “adapt[ing] his testimony . . . to victory rather than to veracity, so as to meet the necessities as laid open by prior” testimony. 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1869, p. 502 (3d ed. 1940); accord, Perry, 488 U. S., at 281–282. Pure sequestration is, of course, incompatible with a defendant's right to attend his trial and to consult his attorney. See Geders, 425 U. S., at 88; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 607 (1972). But a rule prohibiting the discussion of testimony…

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