Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections · ¶20

Even if some candidates could muster evidence well before election day that a rule will likely be outcome determinative, respondents' and the dissent's approach would convert Article III judges into political prognosticators and “invite[ ] findings on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else can have any confidence.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 711 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a number of prominent historical figures can attest, not least among them Charles Evans Hughes and Thomas Dewey, “accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a “simple” endeavor. Id., at 712. And if the prognosticators themselves lack the “political clairvoyance” to predict the winner after all votes have been cast, then surely judges are poorly positioned to assess whether a candidate's risk of loss, months earlier, is substantial. Diamond Alternative En ergy, 606 U. S.,…

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