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Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections · ¶66

Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a candidate need only plausibly allege that the challenged regulation creates a substantial risk of an election loss—he need not predict with certainty that the rule will cause him to lose. See, e. g., Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F. 3d 582, 587 (CA5 2006) (concluding that a candidate who alleged that governmental action “threaten[ed] his election prospects” had established standing). Alternatively, a candidate whose win is more secure could allege a substantial risk of some other concrete and particularized harm stemming from the challenged rule's application, such as an existing or imminent financial or reputational injury. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 296 (2022) (recognizing a winning candidate's $10,000 expenditure as a “pocketbook harm” that “constitute[d] an injury in fact”); Meese v.…
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