Barrett v. United States · ¶16

Textually, the court pointed to § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s mandate that a subsection (c) sentence must run consecutively to any other sentence—including, the court reasoned, to one under subsection (j). Id., at 90–91. Practically, the court highlighted that a contrary ruling would permit defendants who commit especially serious subsection (c) offenses—ones resulting in death—to escape subsection (c)'s mandatory minimums, despite “Congress's intent for every defendant convicted under that statute . . . to be incarcerated for no less than the stated minimum term.” Id., at 90; see also id., at 93–94. And, turning to precedent, the court perceived our statement in Lora that subsection (j) evinced a “ `different approach to punishment' ” than subsection (c) to establish that the two provisions define different offenses raising no double jeopardy concerns. 102 F. 4th, at 92–93 (quoting 599 U. S.,…

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