Barrett v. United States · ¶56

Failing textual support, amicus turns to the statute's operation and structure. But this ground proves only slightly more fertile. Primarily, amicus fears that defendants convicted of and sentenced under subsection (j) will be rewarded with more lenient sentences than those convicted of the less serious subsection (c)(1) offense. He points out that subsection (c)(1) imposes mandatory minimums while subsection (j) speaks in terms of maximums. And he insists that, rather than let subsection (j) offenders out from under subsection (c)(1)'s mandatory minimums, Congress must have intended to authorize subsection (c)(1)'s mandatory minimums plus any punishment doled out under subsection (j). Cf. Ab bott, 562 U. S., at 21 (rejecting construction of §924(c) under which “the worst offenders would often secure the shortest sentences”).

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