Barrett v. United States · ¶57

Lora answers this concern without breaking a sweat. There, we explained that subsection (j)—along with several other provisions enacted simultaneously—“eschews mandatory penalties in favor of sentencing fexibility.” 599 U. S., at 462. It was not lost on us in Lora, nor is it now, that subsection (j) defines an especially serious offense. Subsection (j) simply “refects th[at] seriousness . . . using a different approach than subsection (c)'s mandatory penalties”: by authorizing the death penalty for murder and “the same harsh punishment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaughters.” Id., at 463. It is for this reason, among others, that Lora—anticipating the question this case presents—explained that our conclusion in that case “aligns with” the mutually exclusive relationship between subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) that we endorse today. Id., at 461.

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.