Barrett v. United States · ¶58

Just as subsection (j)'s seriousness is not lost on us, we are confdent—as Congress apparently was—that it will not be lost on sentencing judges. Bound by 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a) to craft a sentence that, among other considerations, refects “the seriousness of the offense” and avoids “unwarranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants, sentencing judges will doubtless recognize the relevance of a victim's death when sentencing under subsection (j). Amicus's worry thus strikes us as more theoretical than realistic. But if it threatens to manifest, it is not without remedy: If, in a given case, prosecutors fear that a subsection (j) sentence will dip below what subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise guarantee, they are free to choose subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)'s low-end rigidity over subsection (j)'s high-end fexibility. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 860–861, nn. 7–8.

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.