National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n · ¶118
And to protect the base limits from easy evasion, the Court has recognized, further regulations may also be permissible. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 222–223; McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 171– 173 (2003); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46–47. Again, the idea is straightforward. If a donor can circumvent the base limits through some type of routing mechanism, the limits will lose all their efficacy: They will become unable to prevent actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption. So to the extent that a campaign finance law is appropriately “tailored to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits,” it will satisfy constitutional scrutiny. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 218. Today’s majority reaffirms that point. See ante, at 27. For example, it describes “earmarking rules” (of which more later) as a “constitutionally permissible way for the…Read in context ›
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