National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n · ¶131

To overturn a precedent like Colorado II, this Court used to insist that a “special justification,” above and beyond simple error, is needed. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014). Stare decisis, after all, “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). It also encourages judicial humility, which is all too often in short supply. Yet the majority could hardly be more dismissive of the “special justification” requirement for overruling precedent. See ante, at 22. The majority would much rather explain why it thinks settled law is wrong than go to the trouble of establishing what it should—an unusual need to start all over.

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