National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n · ¶81
Colorado II, however, is akin to a three-legged stool where all three legs have already been knocked out—here, by post-Colorado II cases. In like circumstances, the Court sometimes has simply described similarly hollowed-out precedents as “so undermined” by subsequent developments that they are “no longer good law” and “retai[n] no vitality.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 217– 218 (1997); Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U. S. 329, 342 (2019) (quotation marks omitted); see also Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 534 (2022) (recognizing that “this Court long ago abandoned” a precedent and treating it as already overruled). The Court has not hesitated to reject adherence to a “doctrinal dinosaur or legal last-manstanding.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 458 (2015). That description is apt for Colorado II.Read in context ›
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