Case v. Montana · ¶20

We decline Case’s invitation to put a new probable-cause spin onto Brigham City. “[T]he probable-cause standard,” this Court has often stated, “is peculiarly related to criminal investigations.” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 667 (1989) (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 371 (1987)). The standard’s history is “rooted” in the “criminal investigatory context.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); see Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100–102 (1959). And the standard has acquired meaning over time by virtue of that context, as judges have assessed, in case after case, the requisite likelihood of finding criminal contraband or evidence. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238–239 (1983). The resulting body of law would fit awkwardly, if at all, in the non-criminal, non-investigatory setting at issue here. So Brigham City…

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