Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) · ¶103

And even assuming most plaintiffs could not meet an FSIA exception, the Helms-Burton cause of action still has plenty of work to do in the statutory scheme. Recall that the cause of action authorizes suit against “any person”— including a private individual or company—that traffics in confiscated property. 22 U. S. C. §§6023(11), 6082(a)(1)(A); see supra, at 3. That fact reveals that Cuban-owned companies were only part of a much broader class of defendants subject to suit under Helms-Burton. And in a “findings” section of the statute, Congress explained why—indeed, explained that the statute primarily targeted private investors. §6081. The Cuban regime, Congress there observed, had sought to ease the financial strain of the embargo by “offering foreign investors the opportunity” to profit from property “confiscated from United States nationals.” §6081(5). That private “‘trafficking’ in…

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