Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) · ¶57

Requiring a plaintiff to satisfy an FSIA exception would therefore eviscerate the cause of action. So it follows that requiring a plaintiff to satisfy an FSIA exception cannot be the correct interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. After all, we know that Congress not only created an express cause of action against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities but also viewed the cause of action as a powerful remedy: The Act contains numerous other Cuba- specific references that assume the existence of actual suits and judgments against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities. For instance, §6064(a) authorizes the suspension of “actions” “filed against the Cuban Government.” Section 6082(d) limits the enforceability of “any judgment against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government” when there is a democratically elected or transition government in Cuba. And §6082(a)(7)(B) clarifies that…

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