Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) · ¶98
The first clue that Helms-Burton does not abrogate sovereign immunity is the statute’s language—which says not one word on the topic. The Act provides a cause of action, stating that “any person” who “traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government” “shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property.” 22 U. S. C. §6082(a)(1)(A). No mention of immunity there. The Act also defines the “person” trafficking in property comprehensively, as “any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” §6023(11). No mention of immunity there either. That provision helps define the scope of the cause of action, but without saying whether a state defendant in a given case can invoke immunity. In other words, the plain text of the Act provides a “source of substantive law” under which a plaintiff can sue foreign…Read in context ›
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