Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal · ¶50
This doctrinal development had important implications for our collateral-order jurisprudence. Under Abney and Hel stoski's logic, once a court designates a defense as an “immunity from suit,” that defense satisfes the third collateral- order criterion. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 870. We have likewise recognized that an order denying an immunity from suit will also satisfy the other two collateral-order requirements. See ante, at 447, n. 3. The denial of an immunity satisfes the first criterion because it “conclusively determine[s]” that a defendant may go to trial. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U. S., at 468. See Helstoski, 442 U. S., at 507 (“Once a motion to dismiss is denied, there is nothing the Member can do under the [Speech or Debate] Clause . . . to prevent the trial”). And a “claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits,” so an order denying an immunity claim…Read in context ›
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