Urias-Orellana v. Bondi · ¶31

The version of the INA in place at the time of our decision did not contain what is now § 1252(b)(4)(B). But it contained a similar provision, which specified that agency “findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.” 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988 ed.). We interpreted that provision to require substantial-evidence review of the BIA's determination that Elias-Zacarias was ineligible for asylum. More specifically, we explained that the provision set forth the substantial-evidence standard for review, allowing reversal “only if the evidence presented . . . was such that a reasonable factfnder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” 502 U. S., at 481. Though we did not explicitly use the term “substantial evidence,” our explanation accorded with how we have long…

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