Urias-Orellana v. Bondi · ¶36

Indeed, subparagraph (B) largely tracks our opinion in Elias-Zacarias. Compare § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”) with 502 U. S., at 483–484 (stating that, if an asylum applicant “seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination, he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfnder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution”). Thus, § 1252(b)(4)(B) effectively restates the pre-IIRIRA practice of applying the INA's deferential standard for factual findings to the persecution determination. Cf. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 80 (2023) (“This Court generally assumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of this Court's relevant precedents” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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